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Introduction 
 
  During the Great Contraction, depository institutions departed from the banking business 
more rapidly than at any other time in United States history. Of the roughly 24,000 institutions in 
operation in January 1929, only about 14,000 remained when the banking holiday began in 
March 1933. Banks failures were clustered during events that contemporaries described as 
panics, but banks closed their doors in large numbers at other times. What caused the banking 
system to contract so suddenly and severely? 
  Economists, politicians, and pundits have debated this question since the early 1930s. 
Innumerable explanations have been offered. The scholarly debate now revolves around two 
competing theories. A traditional school of scholarship maintains that the underlying causes were 
withdrawals of deposits, illiquidity of assets, and the Federal Reserve’s reluctance to act. A 
contagion of fear, a flight to cash holdings, and withdrawals en masse drained deposits from 
banks and pushed financial institutions towards collapse. Federal Reserve mistakes exacerbated 
the credit crunch (Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz, 1963; Elmus Wicker, 1996). A 
contending school concludes that banks failed because the economy contracted. Asset prices fell. 
Loan default rates rose. Banks became insolvent. These fundamental forces accentuated a 
process of bank liquidation and that began during the 1920s (Peter Temin, 1976; Eugene White, 
1984; and Charles Calomiris and Joseph Mason, 2003). 
Scholars support both suppositions with extensive evidence. The evidence corroborating 
the traditional Friedman-Schwartz illiquidity hypothesis consists of data on bank suspensions 
aggregated at the national or regional level. This data reveals bank failures clustered in time and 
space, often coinciding with turning points in macroeconomic time-series such as indices of 
industrial production, the money supply, the money multiplier, interest rates, and the deflation   2 
rate. Narrative sources from the 1930s characterize many of these clusters as banking panics 
(Friedman and Schwartz, 1963; Wicker, 1996). 
The evidence supporting the Temin-White insolvency hypothesis consists of data at 
lower levels of aggregation, or disaggregated data consisting of samples of national banks, or 
panels of banks from within individual cities, states, or Federal Reserve districts. Temin (1976) 
regresses state-level bank-failure data on characteristics of the state and national economies, 
including proxies for poor loans and agricultural distress. White’s (1984) pioneering study 
examines a panel of data drawn from national banks. The most recent and comprehensive work 
(Calomiris and Mason, 2003) analyzes a panel of data for all Federal Reserve member banks. 
These studies reveal significant correlations between the characteristics of banks, the 
environments in which they operated, and their chances of surviving the contraction. 
Differences in data sources are one reason these contending hypotheses coexist. The 
different sources illuminate different dimensions of the banking industry and highlight different 
points in time and space, leading to different depictions of events. Another reason that the 
hypotheses coexist is that the extant sources share several weakness. All of the sources provide 
imperfect information about changes in banks’ status. The extant evidence distinguishes neither 
temporary from terminal suspensions, nor voluntary from involuntary liquidations, nor 
institutions afflicted by illiquidity from banks suffering insolvency. The extant evidence contains 
information neither on the causes of bank suspensions nor the number of bank mergers. The 
extant evidence neglects consolidations of banks in financial difficulties and seeking to avoid 
suspension. The samples are neither random nor representative. The microdata from bank 
balance sheets comes almost entirely from national and Federal Reserve member banks, whose 
experience differed from state-chartered institutions. The microdata indicates the financial health   3 
of the institution only at annual (or longer) intervals, and not at the time of distress. For 
aggregate data, the smallest period of aggregation at the national level is the month and at the 
Federal Reserve District is the year. Key terms remain undefined, leaving much open to 
interpretation.  
This essay examines a new source of evidence that provides a comprehensive view of the 
ways in which banks departed from the banking business and the reasons that banks suspended 
operations. The new source covers all banks – including Federal Reserve members and 
nonmembers, national and state, incorporated and private – from the onset of the contraction in 
1929 and until the national banking holiday in March 1933. The new source contains 
observations for an array of events, including closings, reopenings, and consolidations, and 
indicates the cause of suspension for all banks. The source is the archives of the Federal Reserve 
Board of Governors, whose Division of Bank Operations tracked changes in the status of all 
bank operating in the United States, analyzed the cause of each bank suspension, and recorded its 
conclusion and financial information for each bank on (or near) the date of suspension. 
This essay analyzes aggregate series derived from the St. 6386 database using non-
parametric methods. The goal is filter the data as little as possible, allowing the evidence – and 
the hundreds of bank examiners, accountants, receivers, economists, Federal Reserve agents, and 
others who collaboratively created this data set – to speak for itself. Summary statistics, charts, 
and graphs demonstrate that some types of bank distress were less prevalent than the 
conventional wisdom suggests; other types of bank distress, which according to the conventional 
wisdom seldom (or never) occurred, did in fact occur and may have played a pivotal role 
propagating the banking crisis. For example, some of the most eminent economists of our time, 
including Ben Bernanke (1983, pp. 259-260) and Milton Friedman and Anna Schwartz (1963),   4 
assert that temporary bank suspensions did not occur during the contraction, but temporary bank 
suspensions did, in fact, occur in large numbers during the banking crises in the fall of 1930 and 
1931.  
The evidence presented in this essay helps to answer a fundamental question concerning 
the collapse of the banking system: why did banks fail? This question can be restated in terms of 
the current academic debate as: did illiquidity or insolvency cause the collapse of the financial 
system? An accurate answer to this question must be extended, because the nature of the banking 
crisis changed over time. Before October 1930, the pattern of failures resembled the pattern that 
prevailed during the 1920s. Small, rural banks with large loan losses failed at a gradually rising 
rate. In November 1930, the collapse of correspondent networks triggered banking panics in the 
center of the nation. The largest counter-party cascade stemmed from the collapse of the 
Caldwell conglomerate. Runs rose in number and severity after prominent financial institutions 
in New York and Los Angeles closed amid scandals covered prominently in the national press. 
More than a third of the banks which closed their doors to depositors during this crisis soon 
resumed normal operations. Following Britain’s departure from the gold standard in September 
1931, the depression deepened. Asset values declined. Insolvency loomed as the largest threat 
facing depository institutions. During the financial crisis in the winter of 1933, almost all of the 
banks that failed were liquidated at a loss. 
   Overall, between the Great Crash and the Banking Holiday, both illiquidity and 
insolvency were substantial sources of bank distress. Nearly three-fourths of the banks that 
closed their doors due to financial difficulties were insolvent. Slightly more than one quarter 
were solvent, and without outside financial assistance, reopened for business, or repaid all of 
their depositors and creditors, or merged at face value with other institutions. Heavy withdrawals   5 
were a primary cause of nearly one half of all bank suspensions and a contributing cause of 
another one sixth. Frozen and devalued assets were a primary cause of approximately one half of 
all bank suspensions and a contributing cause of another one quarter.  
The rest of this essay substantiates this depiction of the banking crises of the Great 
Contraction. Section 2 describes the data, defines key concepts, and discusses issues important 
for interpreting empirical work based upon this new and unique source. Section 3 presents 
chronological patterns for the four categories of bank distress: terminal suspensions, temporary 
suspensions, consolidations due to financial difficulties, and voluntary liquidations. Section 4 
presents chronological patterns for the principal causes of bank suspensions: heavy withdrawals, 
problematic assets, closure of correspondent banks, defalcations, and mismanagement. This data 
demonstrates that surges in bank suspensions coincided with periods of increased illiquidity. 
Section 5 discusses the implications these chronological patterns, which corroborate some 
conjectures, cast doubt on others, and raise new questions concerning the causes and 
consequences of the collapse of the banking system during the Great Depression. 
 
2: Data Source and Definitions 
From 1929 through 1933, the Federal Reserve Board of Governors’ Division of Bank 
Operations recorded information about changes in bank status on three forms. Form St. 6386a 
reported bank consolidates. Form St. 6386b reported bank suspensions. Form St. 6386c reported 
all other bank changes. The Division of Bank Operations gathered this data through a nationwide 
reporting network that it established during the 1920s. The network’s purpose was to collect 
uniform and comprehensive information about all banks operating in the United States – national   6 
and state, member and nonmember, public and private. The complete series of St. 6386 forms 
survives in the National Archives of the United States.
1  
As part of its data collecting endeavors, the Board of Governors developed a lexicon for 
discussing changes in bank status and bank distress. In the Federal Reserve’s lexicon, a 
suspension was a bank that closed its doors to depositors and ceased conducting normal banking 
business for at least one business day. Some, but not all, suspended banks reopened for business. 
A liquidation was a permanent suspension. A liquidating bank closed its doors to the public, 
surrendered its charter, and repaid depositors, usually under the auspices of a court appointed 
officer known as a receiver. A voluntary liquidation was a category of closure in which banks 
ceased operations and rapidly arranged to repay depositors the full value of their deposits. 
Voluntary liquidations did not require the services of receivers and were not classified as 
suspensions. A consolidation (or merger) was the corporate union of two or more banks into one 
bank which continued operations as a single business entity and under a single charter. The 
categories of bank distress were typically construed to be temporary suspensions, terminal 
suspensions (i.e. liquidations), voluntary liquidations, and consolidations due to financial 
difficulties.
2 
The Federal Reserve’s lexicon also covered common causes of bank suspensions. The 
Federal Reserve attributed most suspensions to one (or more) of five common causes. The first 
was slow, doubtful, or worthless paper. The term worthless paper indicated an asset with little or 
                                                 
1   The forms may be found in the National Archives, Record Group 82, Federal Reserve Central Subject File, file 
number 434.-1, “Bank Changes 1921-1954 Districts 1929-1954 - Consolidations, Suspensions and 
Organizations-St. 6386 a,b,c, (By States) 1930-1933.” The forms are filed alphabetically by state, name of town 
or city, and name of bank. Multiple entries for individual banks appear in chronological order. To avoid 
repeated, lengthy citations in the body of the essay and this appendix, after quotations from the archival data, the 
information required to locate the form (i.e. name of state, town, bank) is indicated in brackets. 
2   Contemporary publications often employed the terms failure and closure as synonyms, which typically (but not 
universally) referred to the sum of temporary and terminal suspensions.   7 
no value. The term doubtful paper meant an asset unlikely to yield book value. The term slow 
paper meant an asset likely to yield full value in time, but whose repayment lagged or which 
could not be converted to full cash value at short notice. The second common cause of 
suspension was heavy withdrawals, the typical example being a bank run. The third was failure a 
banking correspondent. Correspondents were banks with ongoing relationships facilitated by 
deposits of funds. A typical example is a county bank (the client or respondent) which kept its 
reserve deposits within and cleared its checks through a national bank in a reserve city (the 
correspondent). The fourth common cause was mismanagement. The fifth was defalcation, a 
monetary deficiency in the accounts of a bank due to fraud or breach of trust. 
Completing the St. 6386 forms (and determining the cause of a bank’s suspension) 
involved implementing algorithms designed to classify complex transactions. The algorithms 
evolved over a four-year period, from 1925 through 1929, during which the Division of Bank 
Operations sought comments from bankers and examiners about the accuracy of its procedures. 
When determining the causes of failures, the Board of Governors sought to gather information 
about suspensions from the man on the spot who knew the facts of the issue at hand. The Board 
gathered information from examiners, receivers, correspondents, state banking departments, 
court officers, the bank’s own management, and local and national publications. This array of 
sources, now no longer extant, provided the Board of Governors with an array of information, 
now unavailable to economic researchers, such as the health of a bank’s assets on the date of 
suspension, the deposits lost by the bank in the period preceding suspension, the lawsuits (or 
criminal charges) pending against bank management, and the links that the failed bank had to 
other financial institutions. Therefore, the Federal Reserve agents could determine whether the 
bank had experienced a run, whether closed due to inability to maintain cash flow or due to fear   8 
of impending insolvency, whether the loss of correspondent linkages forced it our of operations, 
or whether the bank closed due to the dishonesty of its management. Modern scholars cannot 
observe these phenomena.
3 
The following sections examine chronological patterns in the rediscovered archival 
evidence. Because the database covers the entire population of banks and contains information 
on all of the ways in which those banks could depart from the banking business, the typical 
problems of probabilistic inference – such as extrapolating from samples, sample selection, and 
censoring – are not concerns. Thus, the examination can proceed in a straightforward manner. 
The goal is to allow the data to speak for itself. I should emphasize that I make no judgments 
about the reasons why particular banks failed. Those judgments were made by contemporary 
experts possessing far more information about each event than is available to scholars today. In 
this essay, I merely report their conclusions, both in their own lexicon and after translating the 
conclusions into terms used by modern economists.  
 
3: Categories of Bank Distress 
  This section examines chronological patterns on categories of bank distress. Table 1 
presents annual data. Several patterns appear prominent. The majority of bank changes due to 
financial distress were terminal suspensions (72.9%). The remaining changes were divided 
                                                 
3   A companion paper discusses the quality of this evidence. It describes in detail how the Board of Governors 
determined the cause of each bank’s demise. The method involved gathering financial data for each institution; 
talking with the regulators, examiners, receivers, correspondents, and bankers who knew the facts of the issue at 
hand; applying a set of algorithms devised to determine the cause of the failure; and reporting the results in a 
lexicon devised to convey the conclusions clearly, concisely, and consistently. The companion paper provides 
examples of the algorithms and copies of the blank forms. The companion paper describes when, where, why, 
and how the Board of Governors collected the necessary information and issues important for interpreting 
empirical work based upon this new and unique source. The discussion emphasizes the lexicon that the Board of 
Governors devised during the 1920s to facilitate their analysis, the methods that Federal Reserve agents 
employed to ascertain the causes of bank suspensions, the scope and scale of the data collection process, and the 
procedures that the Federal Reserve used to validate and cross-check the evidence.   9 
between temporary suspensions (12.3%), consolidations due to financial difficulties (9.7%), and 
voluntary liquidations (5.2%). Temporary suspensions occurred at a higher rate early in the 
depression, when more than one in five suspended banks reopened for business, and usually 
occurred during surges of bank suspensions which contemporary observers classified as banking 
panics. Consolidations due to financial difficulties followed a different pattern. Struggling banks 
were least likely to merge in 1930 and most likely to do so in 1931. The rate of voluntary 
liquidations followed no discernible trend. 
  Figure 1 displays patterns of terminal and temporary suspensions from January 1929 to 
March 1933. The rates of both types of suspensions remained near pre-depression levels until 
November 1930, when the rates rose suddenly. The rise in temporary suspensions was 
particularly pronounced. Few temporary suspensions occurred during typical weeks; many 
weeks witnessed none. Almost all temporary suspensions occurred during waves of bank failures 
such as the banking crisis of fall 1930, when more than 40% of all institutions which closed their 
doors to depositors soon reopened for business. The percentage fell as the depression progressed. 
Less than 20% of the banks which closed their doors during the fall of 1931 later reopened. Only 
a small fraction of the banks which suspended operations during 1932 and 1933 reopened, and 
most of those that did manage to resume operations did so after receiving infusions of cash from 
stockholders, depositors, the Reconstruction Finance Corporation, and other sources. 
  Figure 2 displays patterns of voluntary liquidations and consolidations due to financial 
difficulties. Kernel-smoothing illuminates trends over time. Consolidations rose during the 
waves of bank failures and peaked at the end of 1932. Voluntary liquidations varied greatly from 
week to week, and no trend is discernible.   10 
  Figure 3 indicates rates at which banks departed from the banking business each year. 
The horizontal axis divides the rates into solvencies and insolvencies. The share of solvent 
departures appears above the axis. The numerator of this ratio consists of banks in each year 
which (i) voluntarily liquidated and (ii) consolidated due to financial difficulties (dark gray area) 
plus (iii) the number of mergers of banks not in financial distress (light gray area). The number 
of mergers is a lower-bound approximation, because the series equals ‘mergers’ minus ‘new 
bank openings.’ The denominator is the number of banks in operation at the beginning of each 
year.  
The share of insolvent departures appears below the axis in Figure 3. The numerator is 
the number of terminal suspensions. The denominator is the number of banks in operation at the 
beginning of each year. The values for 1933 include banks which ceased operations in January, 
February, and March with the exception of those closed due to banking holidays declared by 
state and federal governments. The dotted outlines indicate the annualized rate of departure 
during the first three months of 1933, or in other words, what would have happened had the 
departure rate during the first quarter continued throughout the year. The last column indicates 
the rates of departure averaged over the entire contraction. 
  Figure 3 shows that for the period January 1929 through March 1933, departures from the 
banking business were split about evenly between solvent and insolvent. Solvent departures – 
principally mergers but also voluntary liquidations and consolidations under duress – were 
concentrated during the first two years of the contraction (i.e. 1929 and 1930) and during the first 
half of 1932, a period during which the Federal Reserve System pursued an expansionary policy. 
Insolvent departures gradually increased during 1930 and peaked in 1931 following Britain’s 
departure from the gold standard, to which the Federal Reserve reacted by raising the discount   11 
rate and contracting the money supply. Insolvent departures continued at a high rate in 1932 and 
spiked upwards during the months before the Roosevelt administration declared a national 
banking holiday in March 1933. 
  Together, Figures 1 through 3 demonstrate that during the depression, bank distress 
occurred in many forms. Some forms for which data has been available – such as the liquidation 
of insolvent banks – have been studied extensively. Other forms for which data has not been 
extant – such as temporary suspensions and consolidations due to financial difficulties – have not 
been analyzed. The hitherto unobserved forms of distress were concentrated during surges of 
bank suspensions which contemporaries characterized as panics. The concentration suggests that 
the causes of suspensions during panics differed from the causes during ordinary times. The next 
section, which examines evidence on the causes of bank suspensions, strengthens that 
supposition. 
 
4: Causes of Bank Suspensions 
  The previous section documented when and how banks departed from the banking 
business. This section determines why banks did so by analyzing chronological patterns in the 
causes of bank suspensions. A series of tables and figures present the key findings. Table 2 
presents annual figures. Row (a) indicates the total number of banks suspending operations. Row 
(a.1) indicates the total number of banks suspending operations due to problems with assets and 
liabilities. Imbalances often arose on one side of the balance sheet, but could arise 
simultaneously on both sides. Rows (a.1.1) through (a.1.5) display the possible combinations: 
(a.1.1) slow, doubtful, or worthless assets listed as the primary cause of suspension; (a.1.2) assets 
listed as the primary cause and heavy withdrawals listed as a contributing cause; (a.1.3) both 
withdrawals and assets listed as primary causes; (a.1.4) heavy withdrawals listed as the primary   12 
cause and assets as the contributing cause; and (a.1.5) withdrawals alone as the primary cause of 
suspension. Row (a.2) indicates the number of banks suspending due to the closure of a 
correspondent. Row (a.3) indicates the number of banks suspending due to defalcations, 
mismanagement, excessive loans to officers and directors, excessive investment in building and 
facilities, and similar circumstances. Row (a.4) indicates the number of banks suspending due to 
other or multiple causes. The latter consists in part of complex cases which do not fit into the 
mutually exclusive categories above, often because they spanned two or more classifications. An 
example is a poorly managed bank which failed to enforce collections on its slow farm loans and 
which experienced runs after local newspapers revealed that its president embezzled funds from 
savings accounts. 
  In Table 2, several patterns appear prominent. The share of suspensions due primarily to 
problems on the asset side of the balance sheet fell through 1931, rose in 1932, and fell again in 
1933. The share of suspensions due primarily to withdrawals rose through 1931, fell in 1932, and 
rose again in 1933. The ratio of assets over withdrawals varied over time. Withdrawals’ role in 
the collapse of the banking system peaked in 1931, while before and after, asset problems caused 
the majority of suspensions. The share of suspensions due to defalcation and mismanagement fell 
throughout the depression, perhaps because corrupt and poorly-managed institutions lacked the 
resources needed to weather the initial storm. The share of suspensions due to the closure of 
correspondents peaked during 1930. 
  Figure 4, which plots the number of suspensions each week due to the closure of 
correspondents (and for sake of comparison also plots total changes due to financial distress), 
reveals why. The typical week witnessed few, if any, suspensions from this source. The weekly 
mode and median were zero. The mean was one. The weekly number rose during July of 1929,   13 
when the Mediterranean fruit fly epidemic produced a banking panic in Florida, but remained 
near zero until November 1930, when it spiked sharply upwards. 
  Figure 5 paints an analogous picture for suspensions whose primary cause was heavy 
withdrawals. Suspensions due to withdrawals were rare during the initial year of the depression 
but rose following the collapse of correspondent networks in November 1930. During 1931, 
when bank suspensions surged repeatedly, withdrawals were a significant cause of suspensions. 
Thereafter, withdrawals continued to cause suspensions during periods of acute banking distress, 
but the ratio of withdrawals relative to other causes declined. 
    Figure 6 examines the share of suspensions due to correspondents, withdrawals, and 
assets for the depression as a whole. The left-hand pie chart presents data for banks which 
suspended operations temporarily. The right-hand pie chart presents data for banks which 
suspended operations permanently. The shades of gray indicate the percentage of banks 
suspending for different reasons. The color black denotes banks which suspended solely due to 
heavy withdrawals (in key, WITHDRAWALS) but which were in fine financial shape before 
depositors’ demanded repayment of deposits. Most of these banks experienced sudden and 
severe runs. Three-quarters gray denotes banks forced out of operations by heavy withdrawals 
and also afflicted by asset troubles that exacerbated their condition, but which were not severe 
enough to have necessitated suspension in the absence of withdrawals (WITHDRAWAL + 
assets). One-half gray indicates banks in double trouble. Problems severe enough to necessitate 
suspension existed on both sides of the balance sheet (WITHDRAWALS & ASSETS). One-
quarter gray indicates banks whose slow, doubtful, and worthless assets forced them to close 
their doors and where withdrawals exacerbated the situation. Examples include (i) banks forced 
by continuous, slow withdrawals to sell their profitable assets leaving them with a problematic   14 
portfolio, and (ii) banks headed towards failure whose demise was accelerated by depositors’ 
demands (ASSETS + withdrawals). Lightly-dotted gray indicates banks forced to suspend solely 
due to problematic assets (ASSETS). 
  Figure 6 demonstrates that for the contraction as a whole, heavy withdrawals were the 
primary cause of more than a half of all temporary suspensions. The closure of counterparties 
caused another sixth of all temporary suspensions. Asset problems were the primary cause of less 
than a third of the temporary suspensions. For terminal suspensions, the pattern differed. Asset 
problems were the primary cause of more than half of all bank suspensions and a contributing 
cause of another one-quarter. More than eight in ten of the banks which went out of business, in 
other words, were judged to have problematic assets. 
  Together, Figures 4 though 6 illuminate the causes of the initial surge of bank 
suspensions during the fall of 1930 and winter of 1931. Before the surge, the pattern of bank 
suspensions resembled the pattern of failures throughout the 1920s. Banks failed at a steady rate. 
The principal cause was problems with asset quality. The pattern changed dramatically in 
November 1930, when the rate of suspension rose suddenly. The collapse of correspondent 
networks emanating from Caldwell and Company caused the initial increase. Thereafter, runs (or 
fear of runs) forced scores of banks to close their doors, and adverse circumstances pushed many 
weak banks into insolvency. The number of runs increased after the failure of The Bank of 
United States, which was the fourth largest bank in New York City, the eighth largest bank in the 
nation, and possessed one of the nation’s largest branch networks (57 branches).  
During the crisis that began in the fall of 1930, forty percent of the institutions that closed 
their doors to the public soon reopened. Since they reopened without receiving infusions of 
capital or other outside assistance and survived the remainder of the depression, they were   15 
solvent. Moreover, some banks that closed permanently at this time might have been solvent, if 
they had not been forced to liquidate when similar institutions in neighboring communities 
dumped assets on the market, driving down prices, and when a national liquidity crunch forced 
hundreds of banks (which suspended operations) and thousands of others (beset by withdrawals 
but able to continue without interruption) to sell bonds and securities, which were their most 
readily marketable assets, and whose prices fell when their supply suddenly expanded. These 
events are symptoms of a banking system suddenly suffering withdrawals and lacking liquidity. 
Lack of liquidity also bedeviled the banking system during the spring of 1931, when 
suspension surged in Illinois in an event that Friedman and Schwartz (1963) named the Second 
Banking Crisis. During this period, the Federal Reserve determined heavy withdrawals to have 
been the primary cause and slow or frozen assets to have been a contributing cause for almost all 
bank suspensions. On most of the forms, Federal Reserve agents stated laconically that the bank 
closed its doors after depleting its cash reserves. These comments indicate an epidemic of 
illiquidity. Banks’ assets were frozen. Depositors wanted cash. Banks closed when they failed to 
make ends meet. 
The pattern of causation changed as time passed. In September, Britain abandoned the 
gold standard. Fear that the United States might also devalue its currency triggered the flight of 
financial assets abroad. In October, to combat the external drain and defend gold, the Federal 
Reserve raised the discount rate from 1.5% to 3.5% and sold substantial quantities of government 
securities, which reduced the money supply and raised market interest rates. These actions 
weakened the financial positions of banks throughout the nation. Depositors grew increasingly 
apprehensive about the health of depository institutions. Bank suspensions surged once again, 
and suspension rates remained elevated through the winter of 1932. During this period, banks   16 
failed for a wide array of reasons. Heavy withdrawals from healthy banks caused 20% of the 
suspensions. Heavy withdrawals from banks beset by portfolio problems caused 40% of the 
suspensions. Depreciated assets caused 24% of the suspensions. For many of these banks, written 
comments indicated that droughts, declines in agricultural prices, depressions of local industries, 
and depreciations of bonds’ values and securities’ prices had reduced the value of the bank’s 
portfolio so far as to necessitate suspension.  
  During the spring of 1932, the Federal Reserve initiated an open-market purchase 
program in an attempt to reinvigorate banks and reinflate the economy. The attempt lasted only a 
few months. During that period, suspensions fell to their lowest level since the fall of 1930. 
Withdrawals also eased. Liquidity appears to have been available. The majority of the banks that 
suspended operations did so principally due to problems on the asset side of their balance sheet.  
This pattern held true even during the month of June, when a banking crisis plagued the 
city of Chicago and surrounding environs. During that panic, some solvent banks experienced 
runs, but the solvent institutions which suspended operations soon reopened. Devalued assets 
were the primary cause of most terminal suspensions, while withdrawals were noted as only a 
contributing condition, if they were mentioned at all. Written comments on the suspension forms 
indicate that banks were struggling due to declines in the values of securities, bonds, and real 
estate and losses due to uncollectible and defaulted loans. In other words, during this event, most 
banks which experienced runs were either insolvent or teetering on the edge of bankruptcy. 
Illiquidity and runs did not destroy solvent institutions. Real economic forces caused their 
demise. 
  In November 1932, Franklin Roosevelt won the presidential election. Expectations that 
the new Democratic administration would abandon the gold standard induced foreigners to ship   17 
funds abroad and Americans to convert deposits to precious metals. The Federal Reserve lacked 
the resources to counter these external and internal drains. Some districts (e.g. Atlanta) extended 
credit freely to ailing institutions. Other districts (e.g. New York) had to choose between aiding 
banks and preserving their dwindling stocks of gold. Policies lacked consistency across districts, 
and some districts (e.g. Chicago) refused to cooperate with others despite their statutory 
obligation to do so. Bank suspensions rose steadily during this period. Banks failed for many, 
and usually multiple, reasons. Three-out-of-four suspensions suffered both asset problems and 
heavy withdrawals. Only a handful of banks that suspended operations ever reopened, and in 
every case, their resurrection required outside financial assistance. 
  Figures 7 through 9 address a key question concerning the contraction: did (a) illiquidity 
and contagion or (b) fundamentals and falling asset values cause banks to fail? The answer is that 
both were important sources of bank distress. Failures due to illiquidity were concentrated during 
times when bank suspensions surged, during which illiquidity caused between one-third and one-
half of all suspensions. Failures caused by declining asset values and loan defaults predominated 
before November 1930, during the lulls between crises, and after Britain abandoned the gold 
standard, forcing the Federal Reserve embarked on a contractionary policy to counter gold 
outflows. Outside of panic periods, in other words, contagion and illiquidity caused a small 
fraction of all suspensions, while insolvence caused the preponderance. 
  Figure 7 provides two estimates of banks failing due to contagion and illiquidity. The 
lower bound is 1,376 or approximately 22% of the 6,063 banks which suspended operations 
between January 1929 and March 1933. The lower bound estimate consists of all banks which (i) 
temporarily suspended operations and reopened within three months without outside financial 
assistance, (ii) permanently suspended operations after experiencing heavy withdrawals and for   18 
no other reason (i.e. examiners judged their assets to be in good condition), (iii) permanently 
suspended operations after being forced to close by the closure of a counterparty. A more 
complete accounting is 2,739 or approximately 45% of all suspended banks. The estimate 
consists of banks in categories (i), (ii), and (iii) plus banks which suspended operations 
permanently (iv) after experiencing heavy withdrawals and possessing assets which examiners 
judged to be frozen or slow, (v) because they had exhausted their borrowing capacity, were 
unable to borrow, or failed to obtain loans from their correspondent, or (vi) because they had 
exhausted their cash reserves. Written comments on the St. 6386 forms identify banks in 
categories (v) and (vi). 
Figure 8 provides two estimates of the number of banks failing due to insolvency and 
declining asset values. The lower bound is 1,458 or approximately 24% of all banks that 
suspended operations during the contraction. The lower bound consists of all banks that 
suspended operations because their assets were slow, doubtful, or worthless and for no other 
reason. A broader definition yields the figure 3,055 or just over one-half of all suspended banks. 
This broader accounting includes all banks in the lower bound plus banks whose failure was 
attributed to (a) the accumulation of slow, doubtful, or worthless paper with heavy withdrawals 
as a contributing cause, (b) the depreciation of assets, (c) the depreciation of real estate, (d) the 
depreciation of stocks and bonds, (e) inability to collect on loans, (f) impaired capital, (g) local 
crop failures, (h) low crop prices, or (j) local industrial or agricultural depression. The banks in 
categories (b) through (j) were identified by written comments on the St. 6386 forms. 
A comparison of Figures 7 and 8 illuminates differences between the patterns of failures 
due to illiquidity and insolvency. Figure 9 highlights these differences. The figure’s bottom half 
indicates the total number of banks experiencing distress in each week from July 1930 through   19 
March 1933. The top half indicates the share of banks failing due to illiquidity relative to the 
share of banks failing due to insolvency. This share is calculated with the following formulas, 
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where Rt is the share under consideration, which I refer to as the illiquidity-insolvency ratio. Lt 
equals number of suspensions due to illiquidity in week t. St equals number of suspensions due to 
illiquidity in week t. Zt equals the total number of suspensions for all causes in week t. Note also 
that Lt + St ￿ Zt, because a fraction of banks failed for reasons that could not be clearly identified 
as illiquidity or insolvency, such as defalcations on the part of the management, and a fraction of 









t R , is a thirteen-week moving average of the illiquidity-insolvency ratio. 
The moving average is useful for separating high-frequency oscillations from broader trends. 
The number of banks in distress oscillated widely from week to week. The mean of the series 
was 32. The standard deviation of the series was 27. The largest increase from one week to the 
next was 115. The largest decrease was 86. The illiquidity-insolvency ratio also varied widely 
from week to week. For the lower-bound estimate, the mean was -0.071. The standard deviation 
was 0.179. For the broader definition, the mean was -0.142. The standard deviation was 0.286. 
Both series also exhibited trends. The moving averages plotted in the top half of Figure 9 
illuminate these trends.  The lower-bound estimate of the illiquidity-insolvency ratio rises during 
the fall of each 1930, 1931, and 1932. The broader definition rises during the same periods and   20 
also during the spring of each year. To focus on these trends, this essay employs a moving 
average of thirteen weeks, because the periods of heightened distress lasted, on average, for three 
months (i.e. approximately 13 weeks). Series smoothed with different filters and bandwidths 
yield similar results. 
Figure 9 illuminates several pertinent patterns. First, periods of acute bank distress were 
correlated with periods when illiquidity was a more common cause of bank distress. Banking 
crises were, in other words, periods when lack of liquidity forced large numbers of banks to close 
their doors. The banking crisis in the fall of 1931, in particular, was the peak period of illiquidity 
relative to insolvency. Second, during non-panic periods, insolvency was the principal threat to 
depository institutions. When depositors were not withdrawing funds en masse, in other words, 
the majority (and often the preponderance) of the banks which ceased operations did so because 
their assets no longer covered their liabilities and bankruptcy loomed on the horizon. 
  These conclusions can be put on a firmer footing by examining the statistical properties 
of the series. Table 3 indicates the number of banks in distress during weeks when the share of 
banks suspending due to illiquidity exceeded the share suspending due to insolvency (i.e. Rt 
above 0) and weeks when the insolvent share exceeded the illiquid share (i.e. Rt below 0). On 
average, the number of banks in distress during the weeks in which illiquidity was the principal 
form of distress exceeded by sixty to eighty percent the number of banks in distress during the 
weeks in which insolvency was the principal form of distress. 
  As Figure 9 and Table 3 suggest, the two series – the number of banks in distress and the 
illiquidity-insolvency ratio – are highly correlated. The correlations exist for both the raw and 
smoothed series and for both the lower-bound and broader estimates. For the lower-bound 
estimate of the insolvency-liquidity ratio, the correlation coefficient (calculated using Pearson’s   21 
product-moment method) with the number of banks in distress is 0.36. For the lower-bound’s 
moving average, the correlation coefficient is 0.57. For the broader definition, the correlation 
coefficient is 0.25. For the broader definition’s moving average, the correlation coefficient is 
0.42. 
  Table 4 summarizes these correlations. Its four columns report the results of ordinary-
least-squares regressions in which the standard errors have been corrected for autocorrelation 
using the Newey-West procedure. In each case, the dependent variable is the number of banks in 
distress. The unit of observation is the week, beginning with the seventh week of 1929, 
continuing for 210 weeks, and ending with the ninth week of 1933. The first six and last six 
weeks are dropped from the sample to accommodate the thirteen-week moving average. The 
independent variable in each case is a measure of the illiquidity-insolvency ratio. In all four 
regressions, the coefficient on the illiquidity-insolvency ratio is significant in statistical and 
practical terms. The hypothesis that periods when larger number of banks experienced distress 
coincided with periods when illiquidity caused a larger portion of suspensions cannot be rejected. 
The signs and significance levels of the coefficients vary little when the dependent variable is 
changed to other measures of bank distress, such as the number of terminal bank suspensions, the 
number of temporary bank suspensions, or the total number of bank suspensions. In sum, the 
correlation is clear. Periods of increased bank distress were correlated with periods of heightened 
illiquidity from the fall of 1930 until the winter of 1933. 
 
5: Discussion 
  Scholars have long debated the causes and consequences of bank failures during the 
Great Contraction. Some argue that widespread withdrawals, financial contagion, and lack of 
liquidity were the principal reasons that banks suspended operations. Others argue that declining   22 
asset values, large loan losses, and the agricultural and industrial depressions were the principal 
reason that banks went out of business. Partisans on both sides of the debate push their theories 
to the limit, asserting that illiquidity or insolvency was not just the principal or the predominant 
source of distress, but that illiquidity or insolvency was the only source of distress.  
The evidence presented in this essay indicates that mono-causal theories concerning the 
causes of bank closures are inconsistent with the evidence. Illiquidty was not the sole source of 
bank distress. Many depository institutions did not experience deposit losses, but failed because 
the value of their assets declined until the value of their liabilities exceeded the value of their 
resources. Insolvency was not the sole source of bank distress. Many depository institutions had 
assets in good condition, but closed their doors because their depositors demanded funds, which 
the bank could not supply, because it could not quickly convert assets into cash, and it lacked 
access to sufficient lines of credit.   
Both illiquidity and insolvency, in other words, were substantial sources of bank distress. 
The nature of the banking crisis varied across institutions, time, and place. Different portions of 
the banking industry experienced different forms of distress. None of the data samples previously 
studied by scholars has captured the complexity and dynamism of events. 
The temporal patterns roughly follow the description of events outlined by Friedman and 
Schwartz (1963) with modifications made by Temin (1976) and Wicker (1980 and 1996). Before 
the fall of 1930, bank failures were concentrated in agricultural areas among banks that had 
experienced large investment losses. The initial banking panic in the fall of 1930 – with its 
cluster of temporary bank suspensions, bank runs, and collapsing correspondent networks – 
appears to have been a credit crunch triggered by counter-party cascades and propagated by the 
public’s flight from deposits to currency. During later surges in suspensions, distress of   23 
depository institutions appears to have been driven in part by depositors’ fears for the safety of 
banks and in part by declines in the values of banks’ assets. Between crises, banks that closed 
their doors typically did so due to problems with their portfolios and fears of impending 
insolvency. 
Why did the nature of the banking crisis change over time? The archival evidence 
illuminates the initial impetus. During the fall of 1930, Caldwell and Company’s correspondent 
network collapsed. Neighboring correspondent networks collapsed at the same time. Bank runs 
radiated from the locus of these counter-party cascades. The rate of runs increased after the 
failure of The Bank of United States. During the spring of 1931, runs struck large numbers of 
banks in Illinois, particularly several large banking groups centered in the city of Chicago. 
What explains the continued contraction of the banking system? Answers to this question 
can be divided into two classes. The first follows the logic of Friedman and Schwartz (1963). 
The liquidity crisis grew like a snowball rolling down a hill. The initial credit crunch forced 
some banks out of business. Fear of further failures induced depositors to withdraw additional 
funds, which forced banks to sell more assets, which drove asset prices even lower, which forced 
more banks to fail, which confirmed depositors’ fears in a continuing cycle of self-fulfilling 
pessimism. The snowball stopped only when Roosevelt declared a national banking holiday in 
the winter of 1933 and restored confidence in the safety and soundness of the financial system.  
The second follows the logic of Temin (1989). Shocks – droughts, tariff wars, 
contractionary policies, beggar-thy-neighbor devaluations, declines in autonomous consumption 
and investment – battered the economy in the early 1930s. England’s departure from the gold 
standard was a particularly severe stimulus. These shocks reduced asset values and pushed   24 
marginal banks into insolvency. The banking crisis came to an end only after economic recovery 
began in 1933. 
Both of these theories are consistent with the data presented in this essay. Both probably 
explain a portion of events. Their relative explanatory power remains one of the key unanswered 
questions concerning the depression. Other questions raised by the evidence presented in this 
essay are: why did correspondent networks collapse in November and December 1930 but 
endure even greater shocks during the following three years? Why did some banks which 
suspended operations reopen for business, while others whose owners and managers also strove 
to reorganize and reopen, fail to reopen their doors? Why were banks in some states able to avoid 
suspension by merging with healthy institutions at the last minutes but not in others? Did the 
policies pursued by state banking departments and Federal Reserve Banks influence the 
categories and causes of bank distress? Future essays will employ the new archival evidence to 
answer such questions and to advance our efforts to understand the causes and consequences of 
banking crises during the Great Contraction.   25 
Figure 1 





































Definitions: A bank suspension occurred when a bank closed its doors to depositors and ceased 
conducting normal banking business for at least one business day. Banks that suspended 
terminally never reopened. Banks that suspended temporarily did reopen.  
 
Note: Figures for 1933 include only changes occurring in January through March except those 
which occurred to institutions closed by government proclamation of banking moratoria or 
holidays. 
 
Source: National Archives and Record Administration. See footnote # 1 for details.   26 
Figure 2 
Consolidations Due to Financial Difficulties and Voluntary Liquidations 



































Definitions: A voluntary liquidation occurred when ceased operations and rapidly arranged 
to repay depositors the full value of their deposits. A consolidation was the corporate union 
of two or more banks into one bank which continued operations as a single business entity 
and under a single charter. 
 
Notes: Consolidations and liquidations are smoothed using Epanechnikov kernel filters with 
bandwidth equal to four weeks. Figures for 1933 include only changes occurring in January 
through March except those which occurred to institutions closed by government 
proclamation of banking moratoria or holidays. 
 
Source: National Archives and Record Administration. 
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Figure 3 
Solvency and Insolvency among Banks Departing the Banking Business Each Year 
January 1929 through March 1933 
 





























Definitions: Solvent departures consist of distressed and undistressed departures. Solvent 
distressed departures include banks that voluntarily liquidated and consolidated due to financial 
difficulties (summed together in the dark grey area). Solvent undistressed departures banks that 
merged without undergoing financial distress (light grey area). Insolvent departures consist of 
terminal suspensions (black area). 
 
Note: Figures for 1933 include only changes occurring in January through March except those 
which occurred to institutions closed by government proclamation of banking moratoria or 
holidays. 
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Figure 4 








































Definitions: The series All Changes indicates for each week the total number of bank changes 
due to financial distress for all reasons. The series Suspensions Due to Closure of Correspondent 
indicates for each week the number of banks for which the principal cause of suspension was the 
closure of a correspondent. 
 
Note: Figures for 1933 include only changes occurring in January through March except those 
which occurred to institutions closed by government proclamation of banking moratoria or 
holidays. 
 
Source: National Archives and Record Administration.  29 
Figure 5 








































Definitions: The series All Changes indicates for each week the total number of bank changes 
due to financial distress for all reasons. The series Suspensions Primarily Due to Withdrawals 
indicates for each week the number of banks for which the principal cause of suspension was 
heavy withdrawals. 
 
Note: Figures for 1933 include only changes occurring in January through March except those 
which occurred to institutions closed by government proclamation of banking moratoria or 
holidays. 
 






































Note: The pie charts above display the proportion of suspensions attributed to the 6 causes listed 
above occurring between January 1929 and March 1933 except those which occurred to 
institutions closed by government proclamation of banking moratoria or holidays. Suspensions 
attributed to defalcation, mismanagement, multiple, and other causes were excluded from the 
calculations.  
 
Source: National Archives and Records Administration.
Temporary  Terminal   31 
 
Figure 7 
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Definitions: The series All Changes Due to Bank Distress indicates for each week the total 
number of bank changes due to financial distress for all reasons. For remaining definitions, see 
Section 4. 
 
Note: Figures for 1933 include only changes occurring in January through March except those 
which occurred to institutions closed by government proclamation of banking moratoria or 
holidays. 
 
Source: National Archives and Records Administration.    32 
 
Figure 8 
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Broad Definition
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Definitions: The series All Changes indicates for each week the total number of bank changes 
due to financial distress for all reasons. For remaining definitions, see Section 4. 
 
Note: Figures for 1933 include only changes occurring in January through March except those 
which occurred to institutions closed by government proclamation of banking moratoria or 
holidays. 
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Figure 9 
Illiquidity Relative to Insolvency as the Cause of Bank Suspensions 
July 1930 through March 1933 
 
  (a) Share of suspension due to illiquidity minus share of suspensions due to insolvency, 
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t R . See Section 4 for details.   
Source: National Archives and Records Administration.    34 
Table 1 
Bank Changes Due to Financial Difficulties by Category and Year 
January 1929 through March 1933 
 
Categories  1929  1930  1931  1932  1933  Total 
             
Suspensions, Terminal  433  1078  1958  1300  420  5189 
Suspensions, Temporary  70  278  316  161  48  874 
Consolidations Due to Financial Difficulties  54  136  309  151  38  688 
Voluntary Liquidations  39  86  110  99  37  371 
             
Total  596  1578  2693  1712  543  7122 
 
Note: Statistics for 1933 include only the months January through March. Figures do 
not include banks closed due to government proclamations, moratoria, or banking 
holidays. 
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Table 2 
Causes of Suspensions 
January 1929 through March 1933 
 
Causes of Suspensions  1929  1930  1931  1932  1933  Total 
             
(a.1) Assets and Liabilities  242  848  1720  1125  337  4272 
(a.1.1) Assets  102  316  457  354  91  1320 
(a.1.2) Assets (p) and withdrawals (c)  44  142  294  250  61  791 
(a.1.3) Assets (p) and withdrawals (p)  16  71  163  74  22  346 
(a.1.4) Withdrawals (p) and assets (c)  38  145  487  294  116  1080 
(a.1.5) Withdrawals  42  174  319  153  47  735 
(a.2) Closure of correspondent  28  140  97  68  24  357 
(a.3) Defalcation and mismanagement  143  153  159  76  16  547 
(a.4) Other and multiple causes  90  215  298  193  91  887 
             
Total  503  1356  2274  1462  468  6063 
 
Note: (p) indicates a primary cause. (c) indicates a contributing cause. Statistics for 
1933 include only the months January through March. Figures do not include banks 
closed due to government proclamations, moratoria, or banking holidays. Rows 
(a.1.1) through (a.1.5) indicate subtotals of line (a.1).  
 
Source: National Archives and Records Administration.  36 
 
Table 3 
Bank Distress and the Illiquidity-Insolvency Ratio,  
January 1929 through March 1933 
 
         
      # of Banks in Distress 
Rt    # of weeks  Average  
Standard 
Deviation 
         
Lower Bound Estimates     
Above 0    69  46.8  37.2 
Below 0    138  25.7  17.0 
         
Broad Definitions     
Above 0    62  44.4  36.7 
Below 0    151  27.5  21.8 
         
 
Definitions and Notes: see Section 4. 
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Table 4 
The Correlation between Bank Distress and the Illiquidity-Insolvency Ratio  
Ordinary Least Squares Regressions with Newey-West Standard Errors 
 
Dependent Variable: Number of Banks in Distress Each Week 
                   
    (1)    (2)    (3)    (4)   
                   
Constant    36.8    48.3    36.3    49.0   
    (5.0)    (6.8)    (5.4)    (9.6)   
Independent Variable, 
Illiquidity-Insolvency Ratio 
                 
                   
Lower bound    59.3               
    (20.2)               
                   
Lower bound moving average        229.1           
        (55.2)           
                   
Broad definition            24.6       
            (10.4)       
                   
Broad definition moving average                112.9   
                (43.2)   
                   
Number of observations    210    210    210    210   
R-squared    0.13    0.33    0.06    0.18   
                   
 
Notes: Bold faced indicates significant at the 1% level. Italics indicates  
Significance at the 5% level. Standard errors have been calculated using 





Bernanke, B. S. “Nonmonetary Effects of the Financial Crisis in the Propagation of the Great 
Depression.” American Economic Review, June 1983, (73), pp. 257-276. 
 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. 1929. “Memorandum Regarding Preparation of 
Reports of Changes in Status of Member and Nonmember Banks,” Memo: November 18, 1929. 
National Archives, Record Group 82, Federal Reserve Central Subject File, 421.113. 
 
-----  1930. Committee on Branch, Group and Chain Banking, “Bank Changes – Definitions of Terms,” 
Memo: November 5, 1930. National Archives, Record Group 82, Federal Reserve Central Subject 
File, 421.113-1. 
 
-----  1931. Committee on Branch, Group and Chain Banking. “Comments Regarding Preparation of 
Form F.” 23 November 1931. National Archives, Record Group 82, Federal Reserve Central 
Subject File, 421.113-1, Forms and Instructions. 
 
-----   1937. “Bank Suspensions in the United States.” Federal Reserve Bulletin. Washington, D.C.: 
Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System. September, 1937. 
 
-----    Banking and Monetary Statistics, 1914-1941. Washington, D.C.: Federal Reserve System, 1943. 
 
-----    All Bank Statistics, 1896-1955. Washington, D.C.: Federal Reserve System, 1959. 
 
Calomiris, Charles W. and Joseph R. Mason. “Contagion and Bank Failures During The Great 
Depression: The June 1932 Chicago Banking Panic.” American Economic Review, December 1997, 
87(5), pp. 863-883. 
 
-----    “Fundamentals, Panics, and Bank Distress During the Depression.” American Economic 
Review, December 2003, 93(5): pp. 1615-1646. 
 
Carlson, Mark. “Are Branch Banks Better Survivors? Evidence from the Depression Era.” Economic 
Inquiry, January 2004, (42), pp. 111-126 
 
Eichengreen, Barry. Golden Fetters. New York: Oxford University Press, 1992. 
 
Friedman, Milton and Schwartz, Anna J. 1971. A Monetary History of the United States, 1867-1960. 
Princeton: Princeton University Press. 
 
Goldenweiser, E. A., et al. 1931. Bank Suspensions in the United States, 1892-1931. Volume 4. Material 
prepared for the information of the Federal Reserve System by the Federal Reserve Committee 
on Branch, Group, and Chain Banking. 
 
Hamilton, David. “The Causes of the Banking Panic of 1930, Another View.” Journal of Southern 
History November 1985, (51), pp. 581-608. 
 
Kennedy, Susan Estabrook. The Banking Crisis of 1933. Lexington, KY: University Press of Kentucky, 
1973. 
   39 
Lucia, Joseph. 1985. “The Failure of the Bank of United States: A Reappraisal.” Explorations in 
Economic History 22 (October): 402-16. 
 
McFerrin, James B. 1939. Caldwell and Company. Chapel Hill: University of North Carolina Press. 
 
Meltzer, Allan H. “Monetary and Other Explanations for the Start of the Great Depression.” Journal of 
Monetary Economics 2 (1976): 455-72. 
 
-----  A History of the Federal Reserve, Volume 1, 1913-1951. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 
2003. 
 
Mitchener, Kris James. 2004. Bank Supervision, Regulation, and Instability during the Great Depression. 
NBER Working Paper 10475. May 2004. 
 
Richardson, Gary. “The Records of the Federal Reserve Board of Governors in the National Archives of 
the United States.” Financial History Review (forthcoming June 2006). 
 
Richardson, Gary and William Troost. “Monetary Intervention Mitigated Banking Panics During the 
Great Depression: Quasi-Experimental Evidence from the Federal Reserve Border in 
Mississippi, 1929 to 1933..” UC Irvine Mimeo, 2005. 
 
Romer, Christina. “The Nation in Depression.” The Journal of Economic Perspectives. Vol 7, No. 2 
(Spring, 1993), pp. 19-39. 
 
Temin, Peter. Did Monetary Forces Cause the Great Depression? New York: W.W. Norton, 1976. 
 
----  Lessons from the Great Depression. Cambridge, MA: MIT Press, 1989. 
 
United States, Bureau of the Census. Historical statistics of the United States, colonial times to 1970. 
Bicentennial Edition. Washington: U.S. Dept. of Commerce, U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975 
 
Wheelock, David. “Member Bank Borrowing and the Fed’s Contractionary Monetary Policy During the 
Great Depression.” Journal of Money, Credit and Banking November 1990, (22) pp. 409-426. 
 
White, Eugene. 1984. “A Reinterpretation of the Banking Crisis of 1930.” Journal of Economic History 
44 (March): 119-38. 
 
-----  “The Merger Movement in Banking, 1919-1933.” Journal of Economic History. Vol. 45, No. 
2, The Tasks of Economic History (Jun., 1985), pp. 285-291. 
 
Wicker, Elmus. 1980. “A Reconsideration of the Causes of the Banking Panic of 1930.” Journal of 
Economic History 40 (September): 571-83. 
 
 -----  1996. The Banking Panics of the Great Depression. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 
1996. 
 
Young, R. A. “Memorandum Regarding Preparation of Reports of Changes in Status of Member and 
Nonmember Banks.” Memo: November 18, 1929. National Archives, Record Group 82, 
Federal Reserve Central Subject File, 421.3, Group and Chain Banking (1924-1929). 
 
. 